This paper addresses the general question of the role of emotions in risk management, with an application to the siting of a repository for spent nuclear fuel. Although it is true that such siting has been very difficult to carry out without meeting with strong local opposition, there are some exceptions in recent Swedish experience. This recent experience constitutes an occasion for reconsidering the received message from risk perception research since the 1970's. This research has purportedly demonstrated a very strong impact of emotional processes on risk attitudes, which in turn is supposed to imply that these attitudes are rigid and unchangeable. However, when this assertion is looked at more closely it is found that a number of questionable assumptions and overly strong generalizations have been made. The central role played by the concept of "dread" is particularly important. Dread, or a "gut reaction", is by no means demonstrated in the traditional selection of hazard attributes, which contain such dimensions as concern for future generations or voluntariness. Such dimensions may have a relationship to emotional processes but they are not emotional per se and their emotional significance remains to be documented. The items that do measure emotional reactions directly, by asking about fear and anxiety, are found in data on nuclear waste repository siting, to have only weak influence on policy attitudes. The most important weight is instead carried by items measuring expected severity of consequences. The argument is, in a concluding section, carried to the level of attitudes to technologies, which may or may not be related to perceived risk. It is found that an important role is played by substitutability of a technology. If people see no good substitute for a technology which has important benefits, they are ready to accept the risks. The current situation in Sweden with regard to nuclear power can be understood in this light, since no realistic alternatives are available.
High-level nuclear waste (HLNW), or spent nuclear fuel, is produced in nuclear power plants and must be disposed of in some safe manner, for very long periods of time. However, it has been found to be very difficult to find sites because local populations oppose such siting, for a review see Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg 1 . Case studies of many Swedish examples can be found in an article by Sjöberg et al. 2 Extensive experience is available in many countries, among them the USA, Sweden, the UK, France, Spain, and Germany. A recent EU project was devoted largely to these issues 3 . Experts agree that safe technology is available, but the public differs, and this gap between the risk as assessed by experts and the public constitutes a large management problem ~. It is important to know why people are opposed to nuclear waste repositories. The answer to this question is important for its management implications. Is it simply a question of the public being misinformed? The solution then would be information campaigns of various types. But the problem might be deeper than that. It is possible that some hazards, the nuclear ones being prime examples, are so threatening at an emotional and moral level 5, 6 that no information could make people change their minds. If this were to be true, resignation seems to be the only possible management strategy, since public opinion can not be ignored in a democracy 7, 8 . The choice of a site would have to be postponed more or less indefinitely, perhaps waiting for radically new technology such as transmutation which might reduce or wholly remove the problem. What have social scientists to say about these questions? A seminal paper by Starr in 1969 9 opened up the field by demonstrating that societal response to hazardous technologies (risk acceptability) was not only influenced by benefits and actual, objective risk level but also by at least one more factor, by him termed "voluntariness". Several authors suggested other dimensions. In that initial phase, cognitive factors were emphasized 10 . ~Many applications were in the field of nuclear technology and interest has been particularly focused on siting of HLNW. Social scientists in the USA have been pioneers in research on the topic of repository resistance. The major empirical work was conducted in the end of the 1980's and published about ten years ago 11 . The theoretical underpinnnings of this work can be found in the Psychometric Model of risk perception 12 , the Theory of Risk Amplification 13 and in the later development of Stigma Theory 14, 15 . Very briefly, the received message from this work is that people react emotionally to threats, and that they may do so out of proportion with the real threat. People "dread" such a thing as a HLNW repository, display "gut reactions" to it, and form rigid attitudes which cannot be changed by means of information. Possibly, open decision processes and participation may ameliorate the situation 16 but nuclear waste is the hardest of all these problems and so far almost intractable in most countries even to such an approach. The strong impact of these views on risk and public opinion was recently documented in an article by Loewenstein et al 17 in the Psychological Bulletin. This paper documents a wealth of research on decision making and emotion, and on risk perception and emotion. It ends up with a discussion of risk policy where it is claimed that the problem is one of dealing with emotions, and apparently there is little hope to deal with opposition to technology which has a strong emotional basis. Thus the question is, how can you deal with emotions behind policy attitudes, and is it ethically defensible to try, at all? The purpose of the present paper is to present some recent Swedish experience where the picture is different, and to discuss reasons for the difference. Use will be made of two data sets recently collected. One was focused on nuclear waste and the other was more general in its orientation. For the present purposes we concentrate on implications for nuclear technology in the Swedish context. It should be noted that responsibility for siting in Sweden has been passed to a corporation, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel & Waste Management Co (SKB), owned by the utilities and the Government. It is the policy of SKB that acceptance by a community must be present before they proceed to a site investigation. A local veto could in principle be over-ruled by the National Government but all parties wish to avoid such a situation. It is also important to know that a large majority of Swedes agree that spent nuclear fuel must be disposed of somewhere in their own country, so the question is where. Before 2001, SKB had approached all communities in Sweden but only a few were willing to enter into discussions about hosting HLNW. Two local referenda had been carried out, in 1995 and 1997, both advising their respective Councils to reject site investigations. Four communities were still open to discussions in 2001, and they were the ones investigated in Study 1. Pollsters had previously used two approaches to the study of HLNW attitudes, both probably quite misleading. In one case, a leading question was used and it was found in many polls that people were quite ready to accept a local HLNW repository. The question, in my translation, goes like this:
"If it is judged that there is a suitable site for a repository for spent nuclear fuel in your municipality, can you then accept or can you not accept that spent nuclear fuel is stored in your municipality?" This question (a) assumes that there is a consensus about one "suitable" site (and no other sites in the country), and (b) asks about "acceptance". However, consensus can rarely be expected to prevail, especially not about only one of all possible sites, and "acceptance" is a very fuzzy concept. I may accept something because I have to if I don't want to quit my job and sell my home and move somewhere else. This statement has usually led to about 60 percent agreement. It has been taken internationally as proof that Swedes are ready to accept a local HLNW repository 18 . . However, Swedish experience is not in agreement with this overly optimistic picture. The second approach is to ask if the respondent is "positive or negative" to a local repository. This approach has been used mainly by political science researchers in the SOMinstitute of the University of Göteborg,. It has been regularly found that very few, only about 10 percent, say that they would be "positive" 19 . The problem here is that it seems hard to understand how you can be very positive to such a thing as an HLNW repository per se. Yet, when it comes to policy, you may have a pro attitude, for many reasons. You may feel that it is the civic duty of your community to help to solve a national problem, that a repository would bring new jobs to the community, etc. The SOM-institute approach therefore tends to err on the conservative side. More people than those who say they are "positive" would be expected to have pro-attitudes to siting. There is an enormous literature on attitudes 20 and the concept has been defined in many ways. The present emerging consensus is to define attitude operationally as a judgment of "goodness" of a concept or object. Some authors call such a judgment an expression of "affect" 21 which makes things quite unclear because affect normally refers to emotion. Attitude and emotion are two quite distinct psychological concepts. The SOM-institute approach amounts to studying the global attitude, and it is often a useful concept, especially for the purpose of finding explanatory concepts. In the present work, attitude to nuclear power is investigated and related to policy attitude with regard to a waste repository. In our previous work, useful results have been obtained in this way 22 . In the present work, I have chosen to study policy attitude directly, not by asking about "acceptance" or a positive vs negative" attitude. These two previously dominating approaches are like Scylla and Charybdis, both erring but in different directions.
Study 1
This study was conducted in four Swedish communities in 2001. They were all involved in the nuclear waste issue in the sense that pilot feasibility studies had indicated that they might be suitable as host communities for the national Swedish HLNW repository. Before such a decision could be taken, however, extensive place investigations had to take place. The decision faced by the communities was whether they should allow such a place investigation. Oskarshamn in the South-East and Östhammar in the middle of Sweden were both already hosts of nuclear industry, in both cases having power plants and waste management facilities. Tierp bordered on sthammar and was assumed to have favorable geological conditions, whilelvkarleby would be involved for transports of HLNW if Tierp were to become the host. They were both coastal communities bordering on the Baltic. An extensive survey investigation was carried out in order to study public risk perception and attitudes in the four communities. Some of the data will be reported here. More extensive information is available elsewhere 23, 24, 25 . The focus of the present paper is on emotional reactions and policy attitudes.
Method
The samples were obtained from SPAR-DAFA, a government data base of all residents in the country. Strictly random samples of all residents aged 18-75 were delivered. The questionnaire was then mailed to the respondents, in May 2001. Two reminders were sent to those who did not respond, and incentives in the form of lottery tickets and certificates were promised to respondents if they wanted them. It was stated in an accompanying letter that the study was sponsored by SKB and the four municipalities, and that it gave the respondents a chance to influence decision making in their communities. We also made an attempt to obtain a higher response rate by means of advertisements in local newspapers and telephone prompts. Finally, a small sub-sample of non-respondents was interviewed over the phone to check their similarity with the attitudes of the respondents on a few of the questions. The response rates were lower than that we have obtained in similar studies previously, 42.9 percent on the average.. One reason is probably that these communities had populations with a lower level of education than the Swedish population at large; another reason may be a reluctance to take part in the very salient and controversial process of siting. Possibly, fatigue was involved as well, the issue had been in the air for quite some time. Several checks were made on the representativeness of the respondents. They matched the respective populations well demographically with the exception of too many respondents with college education (about 10 percent too many). However, level of education was not a very important variable with regard to risk perception and policy attitudes so the bias was disregarded. The telephone interviews showed that the non-respondents had similar views to the respondents with the exception that they were less involved in the issues concerning nuclear waste. In addition, several questions had been posed in a Gallup poll to these communities in the spring of 2000. Very similar response distributions were obtained, in spite of a higher response rate in the Gallup study. These results suggest that the present data give a fair picture of public opinion, in spite of the somewhat low response rate.
The questionnaire comprised 30 pages in AS format, and contained about 260 questions or rating variables (slightly different in the four communities). The total time to respond to the questionnaire was, on the average (median), 45 minutes. The questionnaire contained many questions about attitudes and perceived risk, with a focus on nuclear waste. A more detailed description is available elsewhere 23 
Results
We will first present results on the level of single items. Emotional reactions to the concept of a nuclear waste repository were revealed in responses to the following statement:
The possible risk of a repository connected to spent nuclear fuel in my community is very much feared. Respondents were instructed to rate their level of agreement on a seven-step category scale, from "Absolutely disagree" to "Agree to a very high extent". Policy attitude was reflected in a judgment of the intention to vote in a possible future local referendum: pro or con a local repository. Five response categories were used, viz. "Surely pro", "probably pro", "hesitant", "probably con" and "surely con". Two interesting results appeared. First, a majority decidedly against a repository was found only among those who chose the most extreme response category on the fear question. Even then, the majority was not extreme, about 63 percent. Even for those who agreed that fear was involved to a rather high degree it was approximately equally common to indicate acceptance and rejection. Second, those who agreed to strong fear at a high level (the two most extreme response categories) were only 24.7 percent of all respondents. These data pertain to the fear of others, as the respondents believed it would be the case. Others are usually seen as more fearful and exposed to risks than one's own person, so the figures are probably biased upwards. Cross tabulation with risk ratings gave a different picture than the tabulation with the fear ratings. The relationship was stronger and the number of extreme responses was larger: extremely large risk was more often rated than extremely large agreement with the statement about fear. The two risk ratings were highly correlated, but that fear was considerably less correlated with the risk ratings. A multiple regression analysis with personal and general nuclear waste risk forced in to a first block, fear into a second, showed that risk accounted for 25 percent of the variance of voting intentions, fear for another modest 5 percent. Fear did give a significant addition, however. These results suggest that fear is largely different from perceived risk, and also that perceived risk is more strongly related to policy attitude than fear is. The results also show that the emotional factor does play a role, but it is secondary to perceived risk. So much for data at the level of single items. A further analysis used most of the 31 items that were employed in order to study the perceived risk of HLNW, as well as the two ratings of personal and general risk. Several indices were computed: Demographics and attitude to nuclear power were also considered in a regression analysis where the five psychometric factors as well as perceived level of risk were used as independent variables, with voting intention as dependent variable. Attitude to nuclear power was measured by one item where the respondent was asked to indicate if the Swedish nuclear power program was good" or "bad" on a 7 step scale. Severity of consequences was the most important explanatory factor, followed by attitude to nuclear power, risk and economic consequences. Emotional risk reactions were not significant.
Discussion
Is the glass half empty or half full? Loewenstein et al. 17 cited my previously published data on risk and worry 26 in support of their thesis that risk perception is a "feeling". The correlation between risk and worry in my study were of the order 0.3, and my conclusion was that risk and worry were largely independent. Now, a correlation of 0.3 is hardly to be. likened to even a half full glass, since only 9 percent of the variance of perceived risk is explained by variation in worry, and vice versa. When 91 percent remains to be explained, it seems reasonable to conclude that the two dimensions are largely independent. The present results support that assertion. The fear rating data emerged as little important in the prediction of voting intention. Besides, fear was very decisive only for the 12 percent who gave the most extreme rating of fear. The other 88 percent indicated more pro than con attitudes. Emotions are sometimes said to promote rationality rather than work against it. The argument is that emotions help us select and sustain action in a forceful manner, and to avoid being "lost in thought" 27 . This may sometimes be true, but at other times emotional arousal sets the stage for twisted and biased reasoning which goes against long-term interests 28 . In policy debates, emotional reasoning is usually seen as contrary to reasoned and rational analysis of the choice under consideration. That is the role of emotion considered here. These results were supported by a regression analysis of voting intention. A fairly high level of explanation was achieved, and several factors were important, among them severity of consequences, attitude to nuclear power, economic risk (seldom studied) and personal and general risk. Personal risk was slightly more important than general risk, which is in good agreement with previous work, which has shown personal risk to be more important than general risk for environment and technology hazards 29 . Attitude was quite important in the present analysis. There are two points which need to be discussed in the connection with attitude. First, attitude does not semantically overlap with perceived risk or policy attitude. This is true even if the object is the same, e.g. attitude to nuclear power and risk of nuclear power. In the present case, attitude refers to nuclear power, and policy to voting intention regarding an HLNW repository, so even the object differs. The relationship which emerges is strong, and that is an important empirical finding. It shows that people who oppose siting also tend to be negative to nuclear power as such. In other words, they are not "NIMBYS", because NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) is a pejorative term for someone who cynically enjoys the utility of nuclear power, yet at the same time refuses to take his or her responsibility for its wastes. In previous work, we found very few opponents to be "NIMBYS" 1 . Second, attitude has the position of being a driving force in the belief structures regarding nuclear issues, it is not a consequence 30 . These results are based on analysis of correlations and not experimental, but they agree well with other work on attitudes 31 .
Perhaps the most interesting twist of this analysis is the following. In the tradition of the Psychometric Model, the most important factor has been termed "Dread". This term clearly suggests that people have a "gut reaction" to a hazard and that such a reaction is the main part of the dynamics of their concern. However, the Dread factor is, upon closer inspection, quite heterogenous. It does contain some items which clearly refer to emotional reactions, but most of the items refer to severe consequences of the hazard (fatal, children or future generations involved etc.), or even to an assortment of various factors such as fairness or voluntariness. The nine attributes defining the dread factor were according to 12 . In the present analysis, items referring to purely emotional aspects were allowed to form their own factor, while the other Dread items formed the factor of severity of consequences. It was then found that emotional reactions played a minor role. It can be concluded that the received message from 25 years of risk perception research, viz, that emotional factors dominate the picture, is due to the unfortunate name given to an assortment of very different items, only some of which denote emotional reactions. The importance of "Dread" is due to the importance of severe consequences, which proves nothing about the role of emotions. Emotions by themselves play a minor role. The importance of severity of consequences is in very good agreement with previous work which shows that consequences play a more important role than probabilities, which in turn are almost the same as risks 33, 34 . It is also in good agreement with the results in the Fischhoff et al. 1978 paper where the item "severity of consequences had the highest factor loading in the factor labeled "Dread". The impression of public opinion is largely shaped by those who are active, the stakeholders. There are stake-holders on both sides in nuclear issues, and their attitudes are more extreme than those of the public at large. 24 However, the con stake-holders make themselves more heard, perhaps because there is a general negativity dominance in social attitudes. 35 It may also be the case that pro stake-holders fear various kinds of reprisals and therefore prefer to be relatively quiet. 36, 37 The issue of risk and technology should, however, also be treated on the level of attitudes toward technology 38 , and here not only risk but several other dimensions enter the picture. , This is the topic of Study 2.
Perceived risk is not the same as attitude. The assumption that risk is an important factor in attitudes toward technology may seem eminently reasonable, but it is often a good idea to question what seems eminently reasonable. In this case it turns out that the idea has seldom been tested empirically, and it is clear that benefits as well as risks should be of importance in accounting for technology attitudes, -but quite possibly a host of other variables as well. Only a few previous studies have concentrated on attitudes toward technology rather than risk or risk acceptability. 39, 40 In the present section, the emphasis on risk is questioned. It is not necessarily true that people will accept a technology even if they accept its risk. Other factors may enter. The focus of concern should therefore be attitude, not risk.. The variation on the attitude theme we will study is whether a technology should be phased out, kept at the current level or further expanded and developed. This is somewhat different from the operational definition used by Gardner and Gould 40 , who studied whether their respondents were content with the level of regulations of a technology. We feel that our approach is more direct and requires less from the respondents in terms of specific knowledge. We also note that Gardner and Gould had considerable difficulties in finding explanatory variables for their version of attitude towards technologies. They used only risk and benefit as variables characterizing the diverse technologies, six in all, which they studied. Turning to explanatory variables in models of attitudes toward technology, risk and benefit are obvious dimensions to include. Further variables which have been discussed in previous research are voluntariness and control. As noted above, Starr's seminal work emphasized voluntariness, risk and benefit. In the present work, the intention was to use voluntariness and control in modeling attitudes to technologies. We also introduce a new variable, substitutability. Some historical examples provide a background for it. Public reactions to hazardous technology have been remarkably different. Nuclear power is a prime example of a technology which has met with much resistance, while air transportation, likewise a hazardous technology (with many more accidents than the nuclear industry) meets with relatively little opposition. Why is this? One possibility is that some technologies are seen as readily substitutable, others not. Electricity can be produced in other ways than by nuclear power, while air travel brings substantial benefits that can hardly be obtained in other ways. It used to take weeks or months to travel distances that can now be covered in a few hours. An early example, which provided impetus for the idea of substitutability, is rail transport. The very first rail disaster in Sweden, in 1864, brought about intense public concern but nobody suggested that railways should be phased out 41 . A possible reason is that railways represented a quantum leap in transportation technology and that good alternatives just were not available at the time. A major accident with much media relevance may, on the other hand, bring about the end of commercial use of a technology, if there are good alternatives. The Hindenburg air ship disaster in 1937 meant the end of a technology which could be readily replaced by a better technology. Many accidents have of course occurred in aviation since then, but the technology is still in use and nobody seriously suggests that it be abandoned because of these accidents. The typical response to an accident is to find its cause and to attempt to ascertain that it will not happen again. The Swedish Railways Corporation (SJ) seems to have pursued the same strategy in the time period subsequent to the initial setback, and it showed, for many years, an excellent safety record. It still does, although major accidents do happen now and then. Summing up, the purpose of the present study was to investigate attitudes toward technology operationalized as whether a technology should be used more and further developed or phased out.
Method
The present study is based on data collected during the summer of 2002 by means of a questionnaire, consisting of 22 pages (A4 format). The questionnaire contained several sections dealing with terrorism and risk, not covered here. The rated dimensions of technology, and ranges of the category scales, were:- whether the technology should be phased out or expanded (1-8) All scales also had a "Don't know" category. These answers were treated as missing data in the analyses. The technologies rated were: commercial passenger aviation, car ferries, microwave ovens, alcohol, genetically modified food, pesticides, X-ray diagnostics, high-speed train X2000, the Internet, mobile telephones, e-mail, nuclear power, wind power, hypertension medicine, private automobile satellite navigation systems, personal ID number, heart transplants, and television. Each technology was rated on each of the 8 dimensions. There were three subgroups of participants. One group of 118 persons had taken part in an earlier survey study of trust and risk perception, and then indicated that they were willing to take part in another similar study. Two other groups had a similar background. In their case, the previous study was concerned with the siting of a nuclear waste repository. The first group was part of a random sample of the Swedish population at large, the other two groups were parts of random samples of the populations of two municipalities (Östhammar and Oskarshamn), n=1 58 and 163, respectively. In earlier work, we have compared data on risk and trust from such samples of people who said they were willing to take part in a new study with data from random samples and found very similar results 42 . After one reminder and about three weeks, the response rate was 71.0 percent, when data collection was closed in the beginning of July 2002. Twenty-four addresses were not usable, hence the net sample size was 415. The total number of respondents was 294. An incentive was used; respondents were promised three lottery tickets worth SEK 75 (US$ 7) for participation. The questionnaires were filled out in a quite complete and careful manner by most of the respondents. There were 164 men among the respondents (56.0 percent), 127 women and 3 who did not state their gender. Hence, the group contained somewhat too many men to be strictly representative with regard to gender. Age varied between 18 and 75+, median 50. The distribution of the sample with regard to education was in good agreement with the population at large. This fact may be surprising since surveys usually attract too many respondents with a high level of education. The present results may partly be due to the high response rate and probably also that the two municipalities Östhammar and Oskarshamn by themselves have populations with a lower level of education than the Swedish population at large. The main bias of the respondent sample is, thus, somewhat too many males and also a predominance of people living in rural areas or small towns. There is no reason to expect that these biases have affected the results to a serious extent.
Results
The ratings of whether the technology should be phased out or expanded were regressed on the five independent variables. The most important predictor was substitutability, largest in 10 of 18 cases, while risk was largest in 4 cases and benefit in 4. The fit was on the average 0.256. The mean ratings of expand-phase-out ratings are plotted against substitutability in Fig. 1 . It is readily seen that genetically modified food is considered highly substitutable and also something not to expand but to phase out. Nuclear power occupies a middle position in both respects. The lowest values in substitutability were given to commercial passenger aviation and heart transplants, technologies which at the same time were given high priorities for further development and expansion. Fig. 1 here
Discussion
On the whole, the present results agree well with some of our previous work 38. . First, we found that the traditional factors of voluntariness and control appear to be quite weak as explanatory factors of technology attitude. Of course, speculative accounts can build a case for such factors which, together with a host of other factors, all have an air of reasonable importance. Only empirical research can show if they in fact have some importance. Substitutability of a technology was the dominating factor in accounting for whether a technology should be phased out or its use expanded. Genetically modified food was rated as the most substitutable technology in the present study. In a somewhat simplistic sense, it can be argued that food can, and always has been, produced without the help of genetic engineering. It may be a hard task to convince people that this technology is crucially important, and public acceptance may therefore be very hard to gain. Nuclear power policy is another, and very different, case in point. In Sweden, there was a referendum about nuclear power in 1980 and a subsequent decision by Parliament to phase out nuclear power at the latest by 2010. Twenty-two years have now passed and Sweden has so far phased out only one of its 12 nuclear power stations. It should also be noted that the nuclear power program in Sweden is managed quite well and that safety concerns are given high priority. It is unlikely that the 1980 decision can be implemented 8 years from now, since there is no acceptable alternative technology and since energy conservation at the scale needed for a phase-out is unrealistic. Sweden gets about half of its electricity from nuclear power plants (and the rest is hydro-power, but that energy source cannot be significantly expanded). We predict that the public, when it realizes that there is truly no realistic and acceptable way to substitute nuclear power in the foreseeable future, will accept the use of this technology until economically feasible and environmentally friendly alternatives technologies are developed. Even if accidents occur in other countries will be likely to affect public opinion, the lessons from the Chernobyl accident suggest that such effects will be short-lived. Controversies about technologies involve the public and experts as important actors. The present results concern the public, but our previous work been oriented towards the analysis of risk management experts. In a separate, yet unpublished, study we analyzed experts' attitudes to technologies and found results similar to the present ones. In addition, Peterson et al 44 analyzed the frequency of articles dealing with various categories of hazards in the journal Risk Analysis, which is a leading journal in its field. It was found that the very risks that experts had assessed as ones that too much attention was paid to, also were the ones most frequently dealt with in the journal. A natural follow-up question is to ask if experts judged risks in areas other than their own as overly emphasized. The answer is that the opposite was clearly the case. Some of these experts acted as promoters of a technology 45 , i.e. they judged risks within their own field as exaggerated, and risks in competing technologies as neglected 46 . These results are potentially important for understanding the trials and tribulations of risk communication. Experts show much the same risk perception and attitude dynamics as the public 47 , contrary to a common statement by workers in the so-called psychometric paradigm. The received message from work according to that paradigm is that experts are "objective" and that their risk perception is not affected by "qualitative" risk factors such as voluntariness, novelty, etc. The empirical basis for that statement, which is very often cited, is very weak 47, 48 . The main difference between the public and experts pertains to the level of perceived risk, not its structure. The level, in turn, depends on the area of responsibility 4 , employment and role of the expert in terms of promoter-protector. The public-relations model of risk communication assumes that people's concerns are mainly affective and can be treated in much the same way as consumer preferences 50 . In other words, trust in the source of a message is more important than the contents of the message itself, and people are anyway too ignorant to assess the difficult problems of risk analysis. This model has not led to very successful risk communication programs, however. The present results throw light on some of the reasons for this failure. Our findings suggest that people make finer distinctions than just a gross affective response of like-dislike. The specific policy attitude is, in turn, a reflection of beliefs concerning the role of a technology in a larger societal context. Risk perception is important, but its role in policy attitudes needs to be further analyzed. The present results point to the sort of analysis that needs to be done.
General discussion
The main thrust of the present article is conceptual. In risk perception research, there has been a road to stigma theory over some 20 years, and much of this work has been ultimately based on the notion that people's policy attitudes are (a) based on "risk", and (b) deeply emotional. These two assumptions have seldom been questioned, or even spelled out explicitly. When brought out in the light, it is seen that they are by no means obviously true. On the contrary, it becomes clear that "risk" is only one of several dimensions that need to be taken into account in understanding policy attitudes, and that emotional factors play a minor role. The development of a belief that "dread" and "gut reactions" have a major importance is especially interesting. Let's take a look of one of the "dread" components, viz, concern for future generations. What is emotional about it? HLNW will be a hazard for a long time to come, and it is certainly quite pertinent to take the long-term perspective into account. This is done in official policy, and expert analysis is behind the long-term projections of hazard. However, it does correlate with some items which are more purely emotion oriented. There could be several reasons for such correlations. The point here is simply that the factors which resulted from analyzing an assortment of quite heterogeneous items was misnamed when the few emotion oriented items were taken as its basis. This unfortunate name has stuck and affected later work which has taken a misleading path. People react emotionally, yes, but their policy attitudes are dependent on a host of factors which may more correctly be named ideological and value loaded rather than emotional. Values and attitudes are one thing, emotions another. It is common in heated debates to accuse the opposite party of being "emotional", hence beyond rational appeals and driven by strong forces which have nothing to do with a rational approach to policy. This superficial and rhetorical stance should not be embraced by risk researchers. What we find is that people have different beliefs and values, and that all variations have relatively little to do with emotions. The Swedish attitude to siting and nuclear power in general is a case in pont. We have now two communities which have accepted that SKB will proceed with a site investigation (Oskarshamn andsthammar). In the third case, Tierp, the Council vote was very close to acceptance, only one more vote had been needed. Part of the explanation for this outcome is the development in Sweden, during the 1990's, towards a more positive attitude to nuclear power in general. There is no longer a strong demand for phasing out of nuclear power. Another part of the accepting attitude is probably due to the local experience in these two communities of competent and safe management of low or medium level radioactive waste (SFR, Östhammar), and of the national temporary storage for spent nuclear fuel (CLAD, Oskarshamn). It is also possible that an open-minded attitude in SKB, and a willingness to listen to the public's concerns, have contributed, as well as a successful program of visits to the facilities in Östhammar and Oskarshamn. It is also possible that the relatively favorable Swedish situation can be understood on the basis of the stable political situation in the country, with conservatives and moderate labour in a comfortable majority when favoring industrial and technological projects. This is true both at the national level and in most local Councils. Strong egalitarian values are represented in an "establishment" of very long standing in Sweden, hence they do not usually take the form of the opposition to technology so common in some countries. There are exceptions, of course. It can be noted that the New Age movement is strong in Sweden and that its divergent views as to the nature of knowledge account for a sizable part of perceived risk 51 . On the other hand, Cultural Theory 52,53 seems to be a very weak explanatory basis of risk perception in Swedish data, as well as in other European countries 54, 55 . All this does not mean that everyone is content with the situation. There are stake-holders who fiercely oppose the siting program and who want to postpone the decision. They are a minority, but a very vocal minority, especially in Tierp where they may have contributed to the negative Council decision, which was taken in spite of a majority of the local population in favor of a site investigation (66 percent). In a separate paper, an analysis has been made of the extremes in risk perception 56 . It is found in most data sets that those who are extremely alarmed about risks are very much fewer than those who, on the contrary, deny risks who may be 3-4 times as large. This does not imply that deniers are more often heard than alarmists. On the contrary, the alarmists are more active and more aggressive 24 . On both sides, there are surely some people who also are strongly emotionally concerned. It is possible that some of the emphasis on emotional reactions in risk perception research is due to the experience of encounters with such people. The mistake was not to listen and learn from them, but to depict the general public in the same terms. Risk perception theories need to take the individual differences into account. They are strong, and both quantitative and qualitative.
